A few years ago, there was a conference at the Hebrew University that dealt with the issue of Jewish peoplehood: "Is Jewish peoplehood a fact or a fiction?" There was participation of Jewish intellectuals from the Diaspora, and obviously there were the Hebrew University professors from the Department of Contemporary Jewry. The main disagreement was exactly along the lines of where one lives. The Diaspora Jews claimed that Jewish peoplehood is a fact (all Jews in the world are a single people), and the Israeli intellectuals expressed grave doubts as to the continuity of a clear peoplehood in the reality of today's Jewish experience. The Israelis spoke in more traditional sociological terms. "Peoplehood", in addition to narrative and descent, includes one's language and its unique social codes - and it includes a homeland. The loss of a Jewish language as well as the clear sense of belonging to other societies would indicate the ongoing disintegration of a common Jewish peoplehood. The Diaspora intellectuals, on the other hand, claimed that Jewish peoplehood means the "sharing of common values". In this view, Jewish peoplehood is a thriving identity, being expressed by so many Jewish writers and thinkers.

I identified with the Israeli intellectuals who expressed sincere worry about the future of the Jewish experience. I felt that the Diaspora intellectuals simply "changed the rules" - they re-defined peoplehood so that today's reality could be presented as a non-crisis continuity. At the same time, I was doing an MA in Jewish studies at Gratz College. One day, my professor commented that he lives in a "Jewish neighborhood" in Philadelphia. I found that quite surprising since I had thought the phenomenon of the Jewish neighborhood had ended in the 1950's. My parents grew up in the 1930's in Cleveland, and indeed they lived in a Jewish neighborhood. I have seen their high school yearbooks (a public high school in walking distance from home) - and literally everyone was Jewish, including the teachers. So, I asked innocently my Gratz professor: "Are there still Jewish neighborhoods in today's America?" His answer was: "Yes, my neighborhood is 15% Jewish!" My next comment was a bit less innocent: "Do the other 85% know that they also live in a Jewish neighborhood..."

This topic of neighborhoods is not too important, but I'd like to state what it is that I observed in this surprising conversation. There is a tendency in American Jewry to re-define the terminology in such a way as to create an illusion of continuity. The Jewish neighborhood hasn't disappeared; rather, we re-define the term as "a neighborhood that has a larger than average Jewish presence".

Not too long ago, I was giving an introduction to Jewish history, so I asked my students: "Who are the Jews". Generally, this can be a discussion that lasts well over an hour, since indeed it's not an easy question. American Jews mostly define themselves in terms of "religious community", and my task in the class discussion is to bring the children to an understanding that there is a Jewish peoplehood. A student raised her hand, and she gave the answer that I was expecting to hear at the lesson's end: "The Jews are a people". Well, I was caught by surprise. The discussion seemed to be over in less than half of a minute. I didn't have a chance to present my old ploys. Generally, I ask American Jews if there are books entitled "The History of the Russian People", "The History of the Greek People", "The History of the Jewish People", "The History of the American People", and more. The answer is "yes, of course". Then, I ask if there are books entitled "The History of the Catholic People", "The History of the Lutheran People", etc. "No", they answer, "there is no such thing as 'the Lutheran people'. There might be a book about the history of the Lutheran Church, but there is no Lutheran peoplehood". Thus, through their instinctive understanding of historical realities, they can be brought to understand that religion is not the sole definition of Jewishness. There is a Jewish people which is a parallel term to "Polish people", and not just "Judaism" which is parallel to "Christianity" or "Islam".

Well, in one particular class, as I was telling, the "correct" answer was expressed at the very first moment, and seemingly the discussion was "ruined". It negated a career-long experience in which American Jews articulate their Jewishness as a religion. Then, suddenly, I remembered my Gratz professor and his very strange definition of "Jewish neighborhood". Obviously, my student has a new "dictionary" in which "a people" means something else entirely. "Apples are a type of fruit. Oranges are another type of fruit. Now, you claim that the Jews are a people. What would be another example of a people", I asked. And her answer was "the Christians"! In short, she also defines the Jews as a religious group which, strangely, became her definition of a people.

Obviously, I don't wish to draw conclusions from the conceptions or misconceptions of children. However, I have just finished reading a very interesting book by Dr Erica Brown and Dr Misha Galperin, entitled "The Case for Jewish Peoplehood". A friend of mine from work had the book, and she asked me to read it and comment on it. There is a note in the book asking not to quote from it (it's not yet the final edition), so I won't give any real quotes; rather, I'd like to share here some of my impressions, all of which are in the realm of the tendency to re-define terms in an attempt to present American Jewish life as a continuity - and not as a break with the Jewish past.

I started the book with a sense of optimism that it would present an identity that all Jews in the world could understand. Dr Galperin spoke of his immigration from the USSR thirty years ago. He tells us that he very much wanted to be an American. Moreover, as he tells us proudly, his daughter was born in the USA, and she has a hyphenated Russian-American-Jewish identity. This was the first troublesome aspect of the book for me. If we wish to define a peoplehood identity, it should be a peoplehood identity that makes sense to all Jews. Wanting to be an American and proudly passing on to one's daughter a Russian identity are certainly not a "Jewish peoplehood identity" that a Jew in Jerusalem or a Jew in Buenos Aires could embrace as meaningful. So, between the lines, we are learning that "Jewish peoplehood" is within the framework of belonging to the American people. This is a new definition of peoplehood, designed for Jews who have an American identity.

The book deals with the question of language, a very typical issue of any peoplehood discussion. Again, I started reading the chapter with a feeling of optimism that there will be a call for serious Hebrew language achievements. Hebrew should be the tool for dealing directly with the wealth of Jewish sources, it could connect Jews with other Jews as a common language - and it would provide a common unique identity for all Jews that is independent of the identity of other peoples and cultures. Again, I was caught by surprised by the definition of "language". The book tells us directly that American Jews do not know Yiddish or Hebrew, so these languages are not on the agenda at all. American Jews must develop their own common vocabulary of "continuity" and "community". "Language" has now been re-defined. In the past, Jews spoke their own languages, so language meant "Yiddish" or "Ladino" or "Hebrew". Now, the Jewish language is "holding a conversation with your fellow Jew about matters of Jewish community life". Instead of facing the simple truth and saying that language in America is a failure that must be addressed, we simply change the rules - and "Jewish language" is now alive and well. It seems so simple to solve such major issues by changing the dictionary. It should be noted that the book calls for adult education to improve Jewish literacy; yet, Hebrew (or Yiddish) remains irrelevant in this proposed Jewish peoplehood. It is not "Jewish peoplehood", a peoplehood for all Jews; rather, the book is addressed to American Jewry and its English language reality.

When dealing with questions of identity, one often looks at the "other" in order to understand oneself. Who is the "other" in this book about peoplehood? They are almost always called "Christians". The book is promoting a renewed commitment to Jewish community life and adult education in Judaism. This is a worthy goal, of course - but "Jewish peoplehood" is not the right term for it. If the Jews were a peoplehood, the "others" would be the "Americans", or the "Arabs", or the "Russians". But the book is clear: The Jews are mainstream Americans, and the issue at hand is the quality of their religious community life. Dr Galperin tells a story of his identity card in the USSR in which his "religion" was written. He is now glad to be in America where he can give real content to this religion, and not just having a meaningless lable of a bureaucrat. Unfortunately, all this is misleading. It's true that in the Soviet ID, one was listed "Yevrey" (Jew) or "Yevreika" (Jewess) - but it wasn't one's religion! It was one's national identity. Other possibilities in the USSR were "Russian", "Estonian", "Armenian", "Uzbeki" etc. It was a peoplehood entry in the ID card. The Jews were a national minority in the USSR. Dr Galperin knows this - so why does he mislead us into thinking that the clerk registered his religion? Because this book is meant for an American Jewish audience - not for the Jewish people everywhere - and for American Jews, "Jewish" is understood as religion, not as a peoplehood. The book is promoting a commitment to the Jewish religious community (which is very worthy) - but the authors have decided to call this commitment "peoplehood". This definition is, however, a new definition. It is meant to leave us an illusion that this is the continuity of the historic Jewish peoplehood.

Peoplehood also includes territory. However, since this book is meant for American Jews, the territorial issue has to be dismissed as irrelevant. The Birobidzhan experiment is mentioned as proof that territory is unimportant in the Jewish experience. Looking eastward for two thousand years - but not arriving - is noted a positive experience. "Wandering" has a message that we should always be yearning for a better world. So, although Israel is part of today's Jewish identity, it cannot be presented as ideal. The return to Israel has only been a 20th century story, so it's not really central in our "Jewish peoplehood", the book seems to be saying. I found that terribly hypocritical. If American Jews don't know a Jewish language (that's a 20th century phenomenon, too), then language is not part of the Jewish experience, and that's just "fine". In today's reality, Jewish identity in Israel based on the Hebrew language and the Land of Israel encompasses half of the Jewish people. How can it be disregarded as "new", and thus irrelevant, in promoting a Jewish peoplehood identity.

Dr Erica Brown tells a story of Israelis from Haifa who came to Boston. There, in Boston, they go to synagogue and "find God". Her message is that Israelis might have territory, but the American Jewish experience has the real essence of Jewish life. I've grown tired of this widely accepted nonsense. Much more Israelis live a traditional or religious Jewish life than American Jews. They have a homeland, and a language, and a community, and a narrative, and Jewish literacy - and many go to synagogue. Moreover, you don't have to explain to them that the Jews are a people. It's simply obvious. In the American Jewish experience, American peoplehood has replaced the historic Jewish peoplehood identity. Instead of dealing with this serious issue and searching for ways to restore Jewish distinctiveness (which is hard work), it's easier to re-define peoplehood by inventing a new dictionary. Problems, however, will not be solved by changing wording. There is a need to admit that Jewish peoplehood in America has collapsed, and then a real solution must be sought.

Yesterday, I had an opportunity to spend the day with a group of Reform Movement rabbis from the USA. They took an interest in my work with American Jewish teenagers, and so within a short time, we were having some discussions about Jewish identity in general. I find these discussions to be terribly frustrating since it is nearly impossible to make a statement that is understood just as I mean it to be understood. Language is imperfect, because another person's understanding is under the impact of a whole different life's experience. However, the conversation was unavoidable.
My first observation was that my American Jewish students see Israelis as foreigners. For me, this is disappointing, I noted, since in my ideal view of Jewish identity, all Jews are a single peoplehood. Much to my further disappointment, the rabbis agreed that for an "American" an "Israeli" is a foreigner, adding that a Jew in Venezuela is also a foreigner - "only religion makes a connection with an American Jew". As always in such discussions, they commented that "not all Israelis are Jews". I explained that "Israeli" is a Jewish identity, receiving in return raised eyebrows of astonishment. Citizenship (a legal status) and identity (how one defines oneself and is defined by one's society) are not the same. A non-Jew might have Israeli citizenship, but he will never call himself "Israeli" - he'll only call "Israelis" the Jews of Israel. I explained further that the Jews of Poland before the Holocaust were Polish citizens, but they were not "Polish" (which is an identity of Polish speakers of Polish ethnic descent) - they were Jews (an identity of the Yiddish speaking population and an identity of ethnic descent). In America, a Jew is not only a citizen of the USA, he actually sees himself as an American. His Jewish identity is no longer primary, as was the case of his Yiddish speaking immigrant great-grandfather. It is merely religion.
Well, the rabbis tried to explain to me the reality of American society. "A Jew would have felt very uncomfortable defining himself as an 'other'. Distinctiveness makes sense in a reality in which the Jews are rejected, but not in an open society". Obviously, I didn't agree. I don't see the survival of Jewish peoplehood as a negative phenomenon, a result of rejection by other peoples; rather, Jewish peoplehood stands as a sociological and cultural equal with others. Moreover, I claimed that the social reality of America is clear to me. The issue that I am raising is one of a value judgment: Is what has happened to American Jewish identity a positive or a negative development? If it is negative, then what could be done today educationally in order to try and return the Jews to the former historical identity? Here is the problem: there is no value judgment. One doesn't hear real criticism that "maybe something is wrong". On the contrary, in this conversation it was claimed that Jewish peoplehood distinctiveness throughout history is an indication of the failures of others ("rejection of Jews").
The rabbis raised their perception of Jewish religious centrality in the defining of Jewish identity. Therefore, it was claimed that there is a problem actually in Israel, not in American Jewry. The Israelis whom they know, so it was stated, are uninterested in religious life. This is a claim that I hear very often. There seems to be a very popular misconception that Israelis are very non-traditional. Yet, there is no doubt that the Israeli public is the most traditional Jewish community in the world. I asked them, just for an example, what percentage of American Jews go to synagogue on Shabbat. "For a bar-mitzvah?", they asked. No, what percentage simply go to synagogue regularly? I ventured a guess of 5%. "It's probably less than that", was their guess. I don't know if they caught the irony of their own estimation, but for my readers I'd like to state it in clear words. They define the Jewish public in Israel as not interested in religion, leaving the hint that the Jewish public in America is different. But their public doesn't go to synagogue. I asked them to give an estimate as to the percentage of Israelis attending synagogue on Shabbat. Well, who knows - but I imagine that it could be well over 30%.
What is the conclusion of all this silly debate? The rabbis were arguing that Jewish peoplehood is not really important. "It is the Jewish religion that really matters" - but their public is not really interested in religion. Jewish peoplehood has been abandoned, and religion is not so important - and yet the only focus of criticism was on Israelis. When did self-criticism go away? How can we restore it?
I tried to put my finger on the trends that have caused the collapse of Jewish identity. I mentioned that there are a number of elements of peoplehood that are now missing in the American Jewish community. First of all, the abandonment of Yiddish has created a new essence. Language carries identity. Yiddish carried a Jewish peoplehood identity, and American English carries the identity of another peoplehood. Secondly, the Jewish narrative has been abandoned. Jews simply do not know our story, simply because their Jewish education is so meagre. Finally, the American Jews have abandoned the homeland. A Jewish community that sees itself in exile is a community that has a homeland which it shares with all other Jews. Today, there is no exile as far as the American Jews are concerned. They are Americans living in America, and so exile is now a meaningless concept. Hence, "Israelis are foreigners" - the point of reference has shifted from the Jewish historic experience into the realm of the American world.
"What about the Russian-speaking non-Jewish population in Israel?" - that was the counter argument! I don't know how to present the failures of American Jewish life without antagonizing my listeners. All I wish to do is to present these failures in the hope that action can be taken to correct something. Improvement can be achieved only if there is a recognition of failure. Well, instead, I found myself discussing a success story. The descendants of these Russian-speakers will be Hebrew speakers. This phenomenon is happening in front of our eyes. They will send their children to the Israeli school system where they shall learn the narrative of the Jewish people. They will also marry other Israelis throughout the coming generations; therefore, the descendants will be speaking a Jewish language, they will see themselves as continuing the Jewish narrative, they will be sharing with us this homeland, and they will see themselves as sharing a common descent with other Jews. Language, narrative, ethnicity, homeland - obviously, they will be part of the Jewish peoplehood. What more could one ask for? I was hoping for a some soul-searching in the American Jewish scene so that its Jewish community will remain part of the historic Jewish peoplehood - and that we should not become foreigners to each other.

The message of the 2009 elections

I am writing this blog in order to express some constructive criticism about the American Jewish experience. In order to solve problems, as I have claimed, one must first admit that there are problems, then define their true nature, and finally one could try to propose some reasonable remedy. However, today, I shall devote some time to the recent elections in Israel. The results are quite unusual: the Qadima Party has received the largest number of seats in the Knesset, yet it seems quite obvious that the Likud Party will be asked to form the next government. Yet, beyond the strangeness of the results, I believe that some important observations can be made regarding the reality of Israel's society as expressed by its voters.

In the elections of 2006, the Qadima Party got its main support from traditional Likud supporters. Therefore, the Likud dropped to a mere 12 seats. Its voters gave their trust to Qadima that had essentially broken off from the Likud (a handful of Labor politicians had also joined, including Shim'on Peres, but generally speaking the new party was a moderate version of the right-wing Likud). Now, the Likud is back. Its voters returned in massive numbers. So, how did Qadima manage to win more seats than Likud? Where did its voters come from?

Qadima drew its support from the traditional Zionist left - Labor and Meretz! Tzipi Livni succeeded in defeating the left, not the right. What has happened?

The Israeli left wing since the Six-Day War promoted two main ideas: 1) holding onto the territories captured in that war is not in our interest; 2) the conflict can be solved by offering the Arabs a fair and generous proposal. It turns out that the left has succeeded in convincing our public that the continued Israeli presence in the territories is indeed not in our interest, but the public has rejected the idea that it's our initiative and our initiative alone that will bring the conflict to an end.

Obviously, the right wing had a different view after 1967. Keeping all the territories was its central theme, and it had very little faith that the Arab side would be placated. I remember hearing a dramatic speech of Menahem Begin in 1972 at Bar-Ilan University. He was convinced that masses of Jews would settle in Israel, and hence we would keep the territories and maintain a solid Jewish majority in the Land of Israel.

However, since the Oslo Agreement (and in spite of its failure), the mainstream Israeli public has adopted the first leftist position. It believes that it is in our very best interest to be rid of the territories. Only a smaller state can preserve a Jewish majority. With the end of the massive immigration of Soviet Jewry, the drama of aliyah has come to an end. There is no illusion, no hope whatsoever, that significant numbers of western Jewry will take upon its shoulders the burdens of the Jewish collective existence. The main reason is, obviously, that Jewish identity is no longer their primary identity; rather, the American identity is central in their lives. Adopting an American identity means that the exile has come to an end (a person with a primary American identity, living in America, is not a "Jew in exile yearning for redemption"). Israel, therefore, is the home of its Jewish population, and only here and there will a handful of idealists join us (in addition to the unpredictable case of Jewish refugees fleeing some terrible regime). In short, the public understands that we will be a minority in our own land unless we go in the direction of partition. Here, the left has won the debate: the right wing Likud and even Yisrael Beitenu want to be rid of the territories!

This, now, explains the seemingly strange fact that left-wing voters gave their support to Qadima, a party which has its main roots in the Israeli right. These former left-wing voters understand that the question of partition has been resolved. There is no fear whatsoever that the territories will be annexed or that any mainstream political party will avoid negotiations with the enemy. This issue has been resolved satisfactorily. The questions that remain are: "Can we placate the enemy? Is the end of conflict a possibility? Is it solely an issue of our offering a generous peace proposal?"

In these questions, the right wing of Israel has won the debate. There is little faith that the conflict can be resolved - and it's not because of us. The Hamas position, just for an example, regards our state as illegitimate, and it regards the armed struggle as a matter of principle. A nation such as Iran has made it clear that the disappearance of Israel is its official state policy. It has no grievances merely about "occupation" or "refugees", etc. Even the moderates of Palestinian society (who are willing to negotiate with Israel) are keen to conduct talks with us only for pragmatic reasons - not because we have any legitimate rights. The conflict is not coming to an end, so it seems, and the Israeli public has essentially expressed in its vote that it has accepted the traditional right-wing position in this regard.

To summarize: The right wing of Israel is no longer the right wing of the past. The dream of the entire Land of Israel has been abandoned. Hence, the left wing could vote for Qadima. Some probably voted for the Likud as well which likewise is not proposing to keep the captured territories. The issue that remains is the issue of "ending the conflict". Since many have abandoned the belief that we could convince the enemy to end the hostilities through some generous offer, they have now casted their votes for the right wing which is perceived (rightly or wrongly) as more capable of "conflict-management". The Zionist left (Labor and Meretz) has been reduced to 16 members of Knesset.